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Scholars charting the emergence of transnational public spheres often focus on the socio-spatial sites that 
are generated by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in their interactions with the institutions of global 
governance. These sites can either reflect strong public spheres within the formal decision-making 
structures of international regimes, or segmented and general public spheres on their periphery. In 
practice, they all suffer key democratic deficiencies in either the ability to communicatively generate public 
opinion or achieve collective will-formation. I argue that if CSOs can successfully weave together both 
general and segmented public spheres on the periphery of international regimes, their individual 
democratic deficiencies could be addressed. To demonstrate evidence of these interconnected ‘informal 
public spheres’ I turn to the nuclear non-proliferation regime where public deliberation has been largely 
invisible and ineffectual within the formal decision-making structures of the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). The emergence of a new CSO-led ‘humanitarian initiative’ on the periphery of the regime 
comprising multi-stakeholder initiatives in conjunction with CSO social forums, reflects the interconnection 
of segmented and general public spheres. This innovative initiative has effectively enhanced transnational 
public debate on disarmament, whilst gaining crucial political traction within the regime.   
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Introduction 
Transnational Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been enjoying a renaissance of late as a key 
ingredient in the ‘democratic soup’ (Dryzek, 2011) of global governance. Despite the heterogeneous and 
often asymmetrical composition of these organisations and their networks, their proliferation as 
consultants, participants, and observers in global governance reflects, for many, an important 
advancement in ‘democratic polycentrism’ (Archibugi et al., 2012). Furthermore, the ability of CSOs to act 
as transmission belts between local stakeholders and global rule-makers has given rise to new thinking on 
their role in establishing transnational public spheres; institutionalised arenas of discursive interaction 
that connect transnational public issues to global policy-making (Bohman, 2010; Brem-Wilson, 2017; 
Eckersley, 2007; Fraser, 2014; Germain, 2010; Nanz and Steffek, 2004; Samhat and Payne, 2003). CSOs 
increasingly operate within, and across, a multitude of transnational networks. The complex configuration 
of these networks, and their relationship to political authority, reflects different levels in the 
institutionalisation of transnational public debate.  
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Eriksen (2005, 2009) suggests a useful threefold typology of strong, segmented and general public spheres 
that relates to the physical distance between the political centre and the periphery of global politics. 
Strong public spheres form when citizens are granted access to deliberate alongside state actors within 
institutionalised bodies of executive decision-making (Eriksen 2005; 349). There is a wealth of democratic 
scholarship focusing on the role of CSOs within these formal deliberative spaces (Brem-Wilson, 2017; 
Dany, 2008; Eckersley, 2007; Germain, 2010; Kissling, 2013; Steffek, 2010). Additionally, there has been 
growing interest in the importance of transnational civil society contributing to public spheres outside of 
formal political decision-making bodies (Conway, 2004; Della Porta and Rucht, 2013; Kurasawa, 2014;). 
These spaces approximate general public spheres, where public communication is only indirectly able to 
influence the political system. Eriksen adds a third crucial ‘middle ground’; which he calls segmented 
public spheres. These discursive sites form within the quasi-political spaces of policy-networks and forums 
where CSOs deliberate with policy-makers in an informal environment (Eriksen 2005: 349; see also 
Bäckstrand, 2006).    
In this article I first briefly assess the democratic possibilities of these three public spheres, adapting 
Fraser’s (2014) democratic criterion of ‘normative legitimacy’ and ‘political efficacy’ to assess whether 
opinion-formation is communicatively generated through an inclusive and deliberative process, and if it 
is able to exert meaningful influence over political authority. I argue that currently existing strong public 
spheres are democratically deficient in both the communicative process of opinion-formation, and their 
collective will-formation. Empirical discussions tend to offer a sober reflection of CSO participation in 
decision-making as well as the ability to attain meaningful political influence. At the more informal sites 
of power I argue that both segmented and general public spheres reflect inverse mirror images of each 
other’s strengths and weaknesses. Segmented public spheres have a higher chance of public 
communication gaining policy traction, yet opinion-formation may be communicatively distorted. General 
public spheres excel in communicative opinion-formation yet as a site of ‘engaged withdrawal’ (Kurasawa, 
2014: 91) they struggle to convert this power into political influence.     
Public sphere scholars recognise the importance of conceptualising the transnational dimension as a 
structured network of interlacing public spheres (Bohman, 2007; Eriksen, 2009; Fraser, 2014; Couldry, 
2014; Risse 2015; Steffek, 2010; Volkmer, 2014), yet few2 studies exist examining the interrelationship of 
these different democratic sites. In this article I examine the particular interconnection between 
segmented and general public spheres and argue that when CSOs successfully connect the two discursive 
sites outside of the formal process of political governance, their inverse mirror images combine to 
democratically strengthen both the opinion-formation, and will-formation, of public debate. I propose to 
call this particular configuration an informal public sphere that reflects intra-public dialogue on the 
periphery of international regimes.  
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of this particular transnational public sphere, I turn to recent 
developments in the highly contentious nuclear non-proliferation regime. In recent years CSOs have been 
granted greater access to contribute to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) discussions via the central decision-
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making bodies of the Review Conferences (RevCons) and Preparatory Committees (PrepComs). Despite 
increased access, these strong public spheres remain largely exclusive and unresponsive to overwhelming 
CSO demands for meaningful dialogue on the abolition of nuclear weapons. Fuelled by these frustrations, 
prominent disarmament CSOs launched a new International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
(ICAN) in 2007, and sought alternative platforms to pursue a more open and public dialogue to bring 
‘democracy to disarmament’ (Duarte, 2009). In 2013, ICAN helped co-organise a new public-focused 
‘Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons’ (HINW) initiative comprised of three unique consultative 
conferences attended by the majority of NPT signatory states. These ‘segmented public spheres’ were 
supplemented by two separate ICAN Civil Society Forums (ICSF) that functioned as crucial ‘general public 
spheres’ feeding into the main HINW conferences. The interconnectivity of these sites arguably reflects 
an informal public sphere on the periphery of the non-proliferation regime. Using a combination of 
interviews, commentaries and policy documents from both the conferences and forums, I show that this 
particular public sphere reflected a more communicatively enhanced environment for public opinion-
formation, whilst at the same time underpinning the unprecedented 2017 adoption of a Nuclear Weapons 
Ban Treaty. The emergence of the Humanitarian Initiative demonstrates how informal public spheres can 
enhance both the normative legitimacy, and political efficacy, of public opinion outside of the formal 
centres of governance.  
Transnational public spheres and the role of civil society  
The concept of a public sphere refers to a ‘sociospatial site of public interaction’ (Castells, 2008: 79) where 
citizens rationally deliberate over social and political issues, generating streams of communication that 
“coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions” (Habermas, 1996: 360). The public sphere is 
not merely a site of opinion-formation, but also one of collective will-formation, where public opinion2 is 
mobilised to influence the sites of political authority. The dual nature of this discursive site has a powerful 
normative and democratic role; a truly autonomous and pluralist communicative environment that 
functions as an interface between society and the state allows for the effective legitimisation and de-
legitimisation of political orders (Eriksen, 2009: 150). Thus the public sphere should be seen as a ‘critical-
conceptual resource’ (Fraser, 2014: 9) that allows scholars to assess the ability for citizens to exercise 
meaningful influence over political authority (Crack, 2007: 344). 
In the field of International Relations, the increasingly transnational nature of public communication 
networks has led to new interest in the democratic possibilities of ‘transnational’ public spheres (Bohman, 
2010; Eckersley, 2007; Fraser, 2014; Germain, 2010; Nanz and Steffek, 2004; Samhat and Payne, 2003). 
Aware of the problems of ‘scaling-up’ the concept without a unified global public, scholars instead point 
to the amorphous ‘discourse constellations’ (Peters et al., 2005: 143; see also Hauser, 1998) that flow 
across borders through a patchwork of interlacing national publics. As such, transnational public spheres 
constitute ‘multiple networked publics’ (Bohman, 2007; Couldry, 2014; Steffek, 2010; Volkmer, 2014) 
where national and transnational communication flows converge around common frames of reference 
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2014; Gilman-Opalsky, 2008; Porter, 2014; Risse, 2015; Trenz, 2008). This 
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convergence is often temporary and issue specific, waxing and waning according to the pertinence of 
shared public issues. 
The social infrastructure of these public spheres is arguably constituted by transnational networks of civil 
society organisations (CSOs) who approximate ‘surrogate publics’ (Bohman, 2010: 435) when they 
represent those individuals seeking to negotiate and struggle for a social contract with transnational sites 
of authority (Kaldor, 2007: 299; Young, 2002: 173). In the absence of formal democratic institutions at the 
global level, public spheres represent alternative democratic spaces when CSOs can effectively mobilise 
public opinion across borders and challenge political decisions at the international level (Bohman 2007: 
65). Habermas’ (1991 [1962]) early work on public sphere theory tended to focus on civil society more as 
a conceptual space, thus overlooking the roles and identities of those actors and social movements that 
were crucial to making and re-making the public sphere (Benhabib, 1992; Calhoun, 1992). By focusing on 
the 18th century ‘coffee houses’ of the bourgeois public sphere, Habermas missed the important 
emergence of subaltern groups to push and expand the boundaries of what constituted public space. 
These movements were crucial in re-orientating the agenda of public discourse, introducing new social 
and political issues, and mobilising public opinion to influence the sites of political authority (Calhoun, 
1992; Fraser, 1992). Organised civil society therefore has a ‘dual track’ role in establishing the discursive 
sites of opinion-formation on shared public issues, as well as will-formation to connect public opinion to 
formal political agendas (Cohen and Arato, 1994: 519–32). 
At the transnational level, CSOs coordinate across complex networks ranging from ad-hoc and informal 
transnational social movements (TSMs), to more formalised and professional transnational advocacy 
networks (TANs). The different configurations of these networks and the discursive environments they 
establish in relation to political authority, reflect different levels in the institutionalisation of transnational 
public debate. Eriksen (2005, 2009) discusses a threefold typology of transnational public spheres; strong, 
segmented and general that relate to the physical distance between the periphery and political centre. 
Mapping the role of CSOs as the social infrastructure of these different public spheres, can help us to 
understand the roles they play in relation to the opinion-formation and will-formation of public 
communication. 
Strong public spheres exist when public communication is connected to the legal and regulatory 
architecture of global politics. This includes the plethora of formal conferences, committees, forums, 
panels, summits and tribunals where deliberation takes place over treaties and conventions of 
international law and order (Brunkhorst, 2005; Eriksen, 2009). These sites reflect strong public spheres 
when citizens are able to deliberate with those policy-makers who are authorised to make legally or 
politically binding decisions. CSOs have gained increasing access to the central forums of international 
regimes, for example at the Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the Ministerial Conferences of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). These ‘invited spaces’ (Cornwall 2002) can also include formally established CSO side-
events within intergovernmental forums, providing that deliberation is re-connected to the formal policy-
making process.  Segmented public spheres form within the discursive spaces of informal ‘policy networks’ 
that bring together citizens with policy-makers in coordination around common public issue areas 
(Eriksen, 2005: 349). These sites can include consultative multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the 
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European Migration Forum (EMF), the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS). They reflect ‘informal empowered spaces’ (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014), 
often populated by more professionally3 orientated CSOs and epistemic communities where ‘bureaucrats, 
experts and organised interests’ (Eriksen 2005: 352) often intersect. General public spheres exist at the 
other end of the spectrum; public forms of communication that are only marginally connected to political 
mechanisms of governance. As such, they form through the deliberative internal dialogue of transnational 
CSOs in ‘created spaces’ (Cornwall 2002) such as international social forums, counter-summits and even 
transnational protests4. Examples include the World Social Forum, Nyelini Food Sovereignty Forum, 
Klimaforum09 and the G20 Counter-Summit.  They can function as ‘counter-publics’ (Fraser 1992) 
challenging established rules and norms of governance, but can also include supportive dialogue with 
businesses5 in forums unconnected to authorised political decision-making (Smith 2011; Stevenson and 
Dryzek 2014). General public spheres therefore represent a form of ‘engaged withdrawal’ (Kurasawa, 
2014: 91) from the formal centres of power, yet this is not to say they are weak publics; they are woven 
into the body politic as a mechanism for ‘cultural production and change’ (Peters et al., 2005: 141).  
Public sphere theory is of course about more than charting the existence of these discursive spaces; it was 
developed to critically interrogate the democratic content and structure of those communication flows 
(Fraser, 2014). As such, democratic theorists highlight how the internal authenticity of the process of 
opinion-formation must be ‘normatively legitimate’, whilst at the same time being externally ‘politically 
efficacious’ (Fraser, 2014; see also Bohman, 2010; Cohen and Arato, 1994; Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014; 
Habermas, 1996). The role and identity of transnational civil society, and those actors that constitute it, is 
fundamental therefore to establishing both a normatively legitimate and political efficacious environment 
across the different publics. As such, I will firstly examine in more depth the democratic criteria of 
transnational public spheres and the expectations placed on civil society, before assessing the democratic 
viability of the different public spheres.   
Interrogating the normative legitimacy and political efficacy of transnational public spheres 
In her discussion on the democratic criteria for a normatively legitimate process of opinion-formation, 
Fraser (2014: 28) suggests that transnational public spheres should ideally meet two key sub-conditions: 
‘inclusiveness’ and ‘participatory parity’. The first principle of inclusiveness directly concerns who is 
authorised to communicate in public discussions. Although scholars often establish the boundaries of the 
public sphere in reference to an ‘all-affected principle’ (Näsström, 2011), this proves logistically 
problematic at the transnational level with multiple demoi. One alternative is to eschew the concept of 
universal inclusion for a multiperspectival approach; public spheres should be constituted by a socially 
and economically diverse pool of individuals to capture as much as possible the rich tapestry of competing 
social and political discourses (Bohman, 2004: 40; Ferree et al., 2002: 308; see also; Risse, 2015; Stevenson 
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and Dryzek, 2014). The second sub-condition of ‘participatory parity’ focuses upon how individuals can 
fully engage in the process of opinion-formation unimpeded. This requires building public space where all 
can express and challenge viewpoints, as well as “dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent 
some people from participating on a par with others” (Fraser, 2008: 405) Public sphere theorists often 
allude to the importance of democratic deliberation as a process of collective decision-making that can 
radically empower public discussion (Bohman, 2007; Samhat and Payne, 2003; Steffek et al., 2010). A 
deliberative approach stresses the importance of the participation of all who stand to be affected by a 
decision, where inequalities amongst interlocutors should be “unbracketed” (Fraser, 1992: 120) to reveal 
distortions in parity, with new mechanisms developed to compensate. Deliberation is thus designed to 
minimise strategic communication and enhance the possibility of persuasion by the ‘force of the better 
argument’ (Habermas, 1996).  
How can CSOs improve both the inclusiveness and participatory parity of transnational public spheres? 
An inclusive public sphere that is “lively, diverse and innovative” (Calhoun, 2011: 321) is firstly dependent 
upon the ability for CSOs to accurately represent heterogeneous grievance claims within, and across, 
national publics. These organisations effectively act as ‘self-appointed representatives’ for a variety of 
domestic constituencies; their democratic credentials can be measured by how far they provide political 
‘voice’ for those individuals and communities “where electoral constituencies fail to coincide with those 
affected by collective decisions” (Montanaro, 2012: 1094; see also Saward, 2008). Secondly, CSOs are not 
simply an assemblage of ‘black boxes’ that interact independently of each other. They are often enmeshed 
within complex transnational networks that are riven with competing interests across asymmetrical 
resource bases. It is important that discursive environments established through these “polycephalous 
networks” (Olesen, 2005: 427) do not result in a form of “skewed-representation” (Montanaro, 2012: 
1105) where some organisations are filtered out from these spaces. Where state and CSO representatives 
meet at the formal sites of deliberation, special arrangements should be made to enhance the inclusion 
of economically disadvantaged CSOs for a full spectrum of representation (Nanz and Steffek, 2005: 377). 
When it comes to ensuring the ‘participatory parity’ of public spheres through the institutionalisation of 
democratic deliberation, scholars tend to view civil society as a natural conduit for communicative 
argumentation (Risse, 2000). Whilst many individuals within CSOs might engage in deliberative practices, 
the organisations themselves and the networks they inhabit are not necessarily deliberative agents 
(Brassett and Smith, 2010). CSOs are just as equally the sites of strategic communication, often as a result 
of increasingly professional actors that inhabit policy-orientated transnational advocacy hubs. Tensions 
can exist across networks when agenda-setting is dictated by vertical ‘insider’ organisations at the 
expense of horizontal ‘outsider’ organisations (Tarrow 2005). Implementing internal deliberative practices 
both across and within networks is therefore essential to ensure that the agenda-setting process is 
communicatively driven whilst diluting the influence of powerful gatekeepers (Della Porta and Rucht, 
2013). CSOs that operate within the formal spaces of international regimes also need to be protected 
from the possible ‘centripetal and colonizing’ (Kurasawa, 2014: 85) effects of being drawn into political 
spaces that might dilute communicative practices whilst undermining accountability chains to the 
periphery. At the same time, these organisations should not merely play the role of observers, but 
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deliberate in key meetings in order to subject decision-making to stronger public argumentation rather 
than typical strategic policy-making (Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005; Nanz and Steffek, 2005; Risse, 2000) 
In order for transnational public spheres to be politically efficacious and fulfil the second criteria for 
democratic authenticity, they must be able to connect CSO-mediated public communication to the 
transnational sites of political authority. As Habermas (1996) argues, the ability to detect and identify 
social and political problems through opinion-formation is only the first step, public spheres need to 
convincingly amplify and thematize these problems in order for them to be “taken up and dealt with by 
parliamentary complexes” (1996, p359). Fraser (2014: 31) suggests that this should be thought of as the 
‘translation’ sub-criterion for public spheres; being able to convert the communicative power of public 
opinion into the administrative power of legally binding frameworks. This sub-criterion might be too 
demanding for practical applicability, however, given the lack of a global parliament. Nash (2014) suggests 
that a more fruitful alternative might be to think of political efficacy as ‘usefulness’; measured by the 
extent that transnational civil society can meaningfully influence sites of political authority. Nanz and 
Steffek (2005) similarly argue that political efficacy should be measured by how ‘responsive’ these sites 
of political authority are to the demands of transnational civil society. They suggest that low levels exist 
when the concerns and positions of CSOs are not discussed and medium levels when policy-makers 
attempt to ‘justify’ their proposals with reference to CSO concerns. Of course, justification may simply be 
rhetorical, therefore higher levels can be observed when policy-makers actually ‘adjust’ their positions 
and either adopt CSO concerns in part or whole, or bring those concerns onto new political agendas (2005: 
376). Responsiveness can be traced by engaging in content analysis comparing CSO written and oral 
statements with the political output in international organisations, or through participant observation to 
record when persuasive public discourses are taken up by policy-makers (Dany, 2008; Nanz and Steffek, 
2005; Steffek et al., 2010; Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014). 
Although these indicators are helpful in assessing the overall democratic authenticity of transnational 
public spheres, Conway and Singh (2009) argue that we should not uncritically assume that the co-
conditions of normative legitimacy and political efficacy can be met across different types of public 
spheres. This is a pertinent point; how ‘democratic’ are the general, segmented and strong publics present 
in global politics today?  I will now turn to a brief empirical examination of the different public spheres in 
light of these indicators, and demonstrate how that they do indeed reflect different democratic strengths 
and weaknesses.  
Transnational public spheres in practice: Measuring democratic authenticity 
 
In recent years CSOs have gained increasing access to intergovernmental conferences, summits, 
committees and conventions; creating strong public spheres at the very centre of international regimes. 
CSOs are increasingly able to present documents, deliberate on drafts, and offer statements throughout 
the formal negotiations over new legislation and regulative frameworks (Brem-Wilson, 2017; Orsini and 
Compagnon, 2013; Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014). Despite the increased presence of CSOs within these 
spaces, evidence suggests that strong public spheres can be deeply exclusive and suffer participatory 
deficits. CSOs are very much vulnerable to political selectivity through external accreditation policies; 
those organisations that do not conform to certain expectations can find themselves excluded from open 
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sessions and their accreditation revoked (Fisher, 2010; Orsini and Compagnon, 2013; Stevenson and 
Dryzek, 2012). Policy-makers still have a tendency to expect CSOs to passively observe intergovernmental 
negotiations and report back outcomes to domestic publics, rather than actively shape the agenda. As 
such they can be excluded from genuine deliberation and shut out of discussions when policy-makers feel 
the need for ‘delicate horse trading’ (Böhmelt et al., 2014; Carroll, 2002: 21; see also; Dany, 2008; 
Eckersley, 2007; Kissling, 2013). Steffek et al (2007) edited a collection examining CSO deliberations with 
policy-makers across a range of intergovernmental fora and found ‘disconcerting’ examples of 
marginalisation, paternalism, loss of independence and even co-option from close collaboration with 
governments and international organisations. Similar conclusions have been reached by authors assessing 
CSO participation and inclusion across a variety of international regimes including: finance and trade 
(Hopewell, 2017; Kapoor, 2005; Scholte 2012;); Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
governance (Cogburn 2017; Carr 2015; Dany 2012); the environment (Eckersley 2007; Fisher 2010; 
Bäckstrand and Kuyper 2017); and security (Atwood 2006; Kissling 2013; Wisotzki 2009). Although there 
is evidence to suggest that CSOs can achieve ‘moderate to high levels’ (Betsill and Correll, 2008) of 
influence and thus political efficacy during formal negotiations, there is little evidence to suggest that this 
has been achieved as a direct consequence of specific CSO texts, and statements deployed within 
negotiations. Indeed, meaningful influence is more likely a consequence of CSO frame-shaping over a 
longer time-span through a multitude of channels (Humphreys, 2008). In short, strong public spheres are 
often democratically deficient due to both distortions in the sites of deliberation, and an inability to enact 
collective will-formation. It is therefore understandable why a number of scholars advocate developing 
new institutional and legal formats, such as global parliamentary assemblies, to try and mitigate global 
democratic deficits (Archibugi, 2008; Falk and Strauss, 2011; Tännsjö, 2008).  
What of the democratic composition of those public spheres that exist outside of the formal spaces of 
executive decision-making? The political efficacy of segmented public spheres, often comprised of 
powerful TANs coordinating with policy-makers in consultative environments, is perhaps easier to trace.    
Key human security initiatives such as the ban treaties on Landmines (1997) and Cluster Munitions (2008), 
and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms (2001), were underpinned by consultative multi-
stakeholder forums outside of formal negotiating channels (Atwood 2006; Price, 1998; Velin, 1997). 
Furthermore, much of the success can attributed to the campaign work of powerful TANs to help frame 
the debate and lobby governments for multilateral dialogue. The agenda-setting power of CSOs is often 
maximised outside of those channels where direct dialogue with policy-makers, the public, scientific 
bodies and the media can create powerful centralised campaign narratives to push debate into the formal 
realm of politics (Borrie et al., 2011; Carroll, 2002; Lang, 2012). Multi-stakeholder forums are often more 
deliberative due to their broader consultative and non-negotiating setting6. However, more often than 
not, deliberation reflects an elite form of communication where ‘experts and the well-educated’ meet to 
coordinate action (Eriksen, 2005: 352; see also; Lang, 2012). There is evidence to suggest that when multi-
stakeholder initiatives are established by participants with a strong alignment of interests, CSO dialogue 
is driven by large professional organisations with a lack of grassroots representation (Bäckstrand, 2006: 
487-88). It was noticeable for instance that the multi-stakeholder conferences preceding the Mine Ban 
Treaty were overwhelmingly dominated by Northern-based CSOs (English 1998: 128). The emergence of 
powerful ‘advocacy hubs’ reflect an increasing gap between professional bureaucratic organisations and 
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those with stronger ties to public grievance claims (Ferree et al., 2002: 300 see also; Carpenter, 2014; 
Fernandes, 2005; Pieck 2013). Ultimately, despite the rhetoric from CSOs within TANs on being able to 
negotiate both invited and claimed spaces, in practice many of these organisations struggle to navigate 
both identities (Yanacopulos, 2015: 30).  
General public spheres that also exist outside of formal channels, can be seen as the inverse of segmented 
public spheres. Those transnational forums, events and conferences that are purposively unconnected to 
policy-making allows CSOs to avoid being drawn into the ‘institutional logics of governance’ (Kurasawa, 
2014: 86) and can thus potentially invigorate ‘the quality of public space’ (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014: 
33). Transnational Social Movements for example, often connect through physical and digital forums that 
prioritise marginalised voices in public deliberation (Della Porta and Rucht, 2013). Similarly, the recent 
explosion of Online Campaigning Organisations (OCOs) integrate virtual community building tools into 
their organisational frameworks to further de-territorialise public forms of communication (Yanacopulos, 
2015). The World Social Forum and its regional deliberative spin-offs, utilise innovative ‘open space’ 
(Rucht, 2012) dialogic techniques that improve both the inclusiveness, and participatory parity, of opinion-
formation. Despite exhibiting higher levels of normative legitimacy than the other more policy-orientated 
public spheres, unfortunately these spaces often lack the ability to translate public communication into 
political will-formation (Conway and Singh, 2009; Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004). The political efficacy of 
public opinion within these transnational spaces is exceptionally difficult to trace without any meaningful 
connection to policy-makers.   
On the periphery of international regimes, segmented public spheres can generate significant political 
traction but often at the expense of inclusive dialogue and public agenda setting, whilst general publics 
can generate radically inclusive forms of public communication that are all too often isolated from political 
influence. If we accept that transnational public spheres constitute a ‘field of discursive connections’ 
(Calhoun, 1992: 37) then there is scope to think about the interconnection of these general and segmented 
public spheres. Given the inverse democratic strengths and weaknesses of the two sites, CSO networks 
that can successfully weave the two together might be able to improve both the opinion-formation, and 
collective will-formation, of transnational public communication. I propose to think about this 
interconnectivity as constituting an informal public sphere within international regimes where these 
discursive sites can generate substantial political pressure from a distance, whilst maintaining high levels 
of normative legitimacy. To investigate this possibility, I turn to an empirical examination of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime where CSOs have traditionally struggled to generate opinion-formation and 
political will-formation within the formal sites underpinning the regime. The creation of CSO-led social 
forums and connecting multi-stakeholder conferences under the auspices of a new Humanitarian Impact 
of Nuclear Weapons (HINW) initiative, arguably constitutes such an informal public sphere. I argue that 
these dialogic spaces have had significant impact on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) whilst 
providing new democratic channels for public debate.   
From outside to inside: CSOs and strong public spheres in the nuclear non-proliferation regime  
The global nuclear non-proliferation regime comprises a broad array of international organisations, 
treaties, initiatives, summits and networks that govern the interconnected issue areas of non-
proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. These ‘three pillars’ of the 
regime are reflected in the landmark 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with a legally 
binding framework emphasizing: the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons by current Non-Nuclear 
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Weapons states (NNWS); the denial of assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons by the Nuclear 
Weapons States (NWS) who also agree to eventual disarmament; and guaranteed access to peaceful 
civilian nuclear technology for all signatories. The NPT thus functions as the ‘centrepiece’ (Thakur et 
al., 2008: 5) of the non-proliferation regime, representing a ‘grand bargain’ struck between the NWS 
and the NNWS to work together to stop nuclear proliferation whilst moving towards complete 
disarmament. Whilst the treaty itself constitutes the rules and principles of the regime, it is constantly 
reviewed and scrutinised at a recurring quinquennial NPT Review Conference (RevCon) preceded by 
three separate NPT Preparatory Committees (PrepComs) to address substantive and procedural issues 
relating to the treaty. Historically, discussions during the RevCons and PrepComs have been steered 
by the NWS to focus on non-proliferation and incremental arms control to ensure strategic stability in 
an unstable world (Walker 2011). A substantial fracture, however, has emerged between the NWS 
and NNWS where the latter feel aggrieved at the slow pace of this ‘incremental steps’7 approach to 
disarmament. These states argue that they only agreed to lock themselves into a position of nuclear 
inferiority if the NWS would take their disarmament obligations seriously (Bukovansky et al 2012: 87). 
At stake is the interpretation of Article VI of the NPT concerning the pursuit of disarmament “in good 
faith” by the NWS. The NNWS point to the 1995 International Court of Justice’s ruling on the illegality 
of nuclear weapons, the agreed ‘13 practical steps’ at the 2000 RevCon and the agreed Action Plan of 
the 2010 RevCon, to reiterate that a concrete road-map for the elimination of nuclear weapons should 
be on the RevCon agenda. This position is often vocalised by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of 
states and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) who argue that elimination is entirely consistent with the 
promises underpinning Article VI (NPT 2015a; NPT 2015b). The frustration of the NNWS is also widely 
mirrored by those transnational CSOs who attempt to engage with the regime. An overwhelming 
majority of CSOs have long championed nuclear elimination under article VI, and feel aggrieved not to 
have a strong vocal presence within the RevCon debates.  
CSOs were only first able to participate in the formal deliberations of the NPT at the 1994 PrepCom 
where they could attend open meetings, submit documentation and brief delegates “on the margins 
of the Committee’s deliberations” (NPT, 1994). Taking advantage of these new spaces, a group of CSOs 
formed an ‘NGO Abolition Caucus’ at the 1995 RevCon and presented an 11-point statement on the 
unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons. Over 200 CSOs then formed Abolition 2000; a 
decentralised network calling for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) to be negotiated by the end 
of the century (Archer 2005). A working group affiliated to the network successfully drafted a model 
NWC that, although submitted to the UN in 1997 by Costa Rica, received little meaningful uptake by 
states in the following 2000 RevCon.   
Despite amassing over two thousand member-organisations, Abolition 2000 failed to achieve its 
timetabled NWC. However, lessons learnt from the successful International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL) underpinning the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty gave impetus to the rise of a new centralised 
campaign advocating nuclear disarmament. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
(ICAN) was launched at the 2007 PrepCom, underpinned by the Nobel-prize-winning International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), with the ambition of reframing the discourse 
on nuclear weapons and promoting treaty negotiations with like-minded states. ICAN’s launch 
                         
7 This ‘building blocks’ approach centres on strategic arms reductions, confidence building, and nuclear 
security  
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coincided with new regulations at the 2007 PrepCom granting CSOs previously unheard-of access to 
all debates and thematic discussions with government delegates (Kissling, 2013: 58; Nordstrom, 2007: 
1–2). At the same time, the original 1997 draft NWC was subsequently updated and badged under the 
ICAN umbrella to push for concrete elimination talks. At the 2010 RevCon, 144 states voiced strong 
support for kick-starting discussions on an NWC, yet despite this ‘massive jump in statements’ 
(Johnson 2010) the final consensus document made only the vaguest of passing reference to the 
convention (NPT, 2010b, 2010a). IPPNW bemoaned that the NWS continued to ‘resist inclusion of 
reference to the convention’ despite overwhelming calls from states and civil society (Loretz 2010). 
One of ICAN’s campaign directors lamented the ‘tired old mantra of arms control’ (ICAN 2010: 24) 
whilst the campaign itself put out a report expressing disappointment in the current system of ‘nuclear 
apartheid’ (ICAN 2010: 1) where different standards seem to apply to different states within the NPT.  
Although CSO access at the RevCons to brief delegates and ‘attend deliberations’ (Duarte, 2009) 
signifies the emergence of a strong public sphere at the heart of the regime, the normative legitimacy 
of these deliberative spaces is problematic. One of the obstacles to the production of opinion-
formation within the PrepCom and RevCon process, is that CSOs often remain isolated from the sites 
of meaningful deliberation. Kissling’s (2013) analysis of the 2005 RevCon suggests that key deliberative 
discussions were dominated by a small core of powerful delegates who engaged in strategic bargaining 
behind closed doors (2013: 174). Although three of ICAN’s steering group organisations made official 
statements at the 2010 RevCon, CSOs were not invited to join the new subsidiary bodies that had been 
established under each of the three main committees. ICAN’s current executive director argued that 
a number of key revisions to draft documents were made during these closed deliberative sessions 
which took them outside of the realm of public scrutiny (Fihn, 2010). Similarly, only 16-20 delegates 
in conjunction with the RevCon president deliberated over the content of the final 2010 consensus 
behind closed doors (Johnson, 2010). There have been a few reform attempts to date; the Chair’s draft 
recommendation at the 2009 PrepCom called for enhanced CSO participation, however this was 
heavily watered down in subsequent drafts (NPT, 2009a, 2009b). Ultimately, the key deliberative 
spaces within the NPT lack the meaningful participation of CSOs who remain very much ‘relegated to 
the hallways’ (Kissling, 2013: 70). Similarly, the failure of CSOs under the umbrella of both Abolition 
2000 and ICAN to generate ‘meaningful’ debate amongst government delegates up until the 2010 
RevCon, demonstrates a substantial deficit in the political efficacy of transnational public opinion. 
Given the frustration felt by both the NNWS and CSOs at the culmination of the 2010 RevCon, ICAN 
joined a large number of states in exploring other avenues through which to discuss nuclear abolition. 
The RevCon’s perceived elitism and closed networks led to calls from various organisations within 
ICAN for new thinking on how to open up the NPT to broader public communication and bring 
‘democracy to disarmament’ (Duarte, 2009; Wright, 2010: 3). The campaign began internal 
deliberations on how to ‘think outside the bomb’ (ICAN 2010: 39) with regards to supporting the 
majority of NNWS in broadening the disarmament debate. In 2013 the opportunity arose to co-
organise a set of consultative conferences known as the Humanitarian Impact on Nuclear Weapons 
(HINW) Initiative   
 
From inside to outside: ICAN and the humanitarian initiative  
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At the end of the 2010 RevCon, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) managed to 
successfully convince Switzerland, Austria and Norway to introduce a sentence in the consensus 
document expressing deep concern at the ‘catastrophic humanitarian consequences’ of nuclear 
detonation (Sauer, 2015: 7–8). As a result, the ICRC in conjunction with ICAN began to heavily promote 
a humanitarian shift in nuclear disarmament with two key arguments, first; that the use of nuclear 
weapons would have such dire consequences that to use them would constitute omnicidal 
destruction, thus breaching all humanitarian principles. Second; in the result of a nuclear detonation, 
no organisation or state could effectively respond with adequate humanitarian assistance to save lives 
(Løvold et al., 2013: 147). This broader human security approach connecting environmental, health 
and humanitarian law, shifts the focus away from the strategic narratives of nuclear deterrence and 
back to the public opposition to nuclear weapons (Løvold et al., 2013: 146). The campaign undertook 
a two-prong approach that focused on pushing the humanitarian line with government ministries and 
policy-makers, whilst ‘generating a groundswell of public support’ (Wright, 2007) to expand the 
movement and consolidate pressure in support of their goals (Løvold et al., 2013: 147–149). Crucially, 
ICAN campaigners recognised that promoting a better understanding of the catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons could help to build public support towards a process 
to ban nuclear weapons (ICAN 2012). Concurrently a number of frustrated NNWS became interested 
in this humanitarian narrative and the possibility of galvanising a new perspective on disarmament. At 
the 2012 PrepCom, the Norwegian delegation delivered a statement inviting all states and CSOs to an 
informal conference on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear engagement. 
Norway hosted what was to become the first of three key HINW multi-stakeholder conferences held 
in Oslo (2013), Narayit (2014) and Vienna (2014) with ICAN as co-organisers. These conferences reflect 
the formation of segmented public spheres; non-negotiating, consultative and informal in nature, 
connecting CSOs to governmental delegates. Crucially, ICAN hosted its own ICAN Civil Society Forum 
(ICSF) in the days prior to both the Oslo and Vienna conferences. These forums consolidated discussion 
amongst ICAN organisations and activists about the upcoming HINW conferences in an open 
environment without political influence. As a result, the ICSFs should be seen as general public 
spheres; public communication that coalesces around common reference points but disconnected 
from policy-makers. This article will now turn to an examination of how the Humanitarian Initiative 
2013-2014 functioned as an informal public sphere; a politically influential set of discourses emerging 
from the interconnection of segmented and general public spheres outside the formal channels of the 
RevCon. I argue that the combination of these deliberative spaces improved both the normative 
legitimacy, and the political efficacy, of public communication on disarmament; enhancing the 
democratic legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime.  
Informal publics and normative legitimacy: The ICAN civil society forums and HINW conferences  
In order for the humanitarian initiative to function as a credible site of opinion-formation, both the 
forums and conferences need to be highly inclusive with a broad range of voices of interests. It is 
worth therefore briefly assessing the composition of ICAN as the key transnational advocacy network 
functioning as the social infrastructure of these spaces. The campaign is comprised of 440 CSOs in over 
100 countries that aims to strike a balance between grassroots driven organisations and professional 
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advocacy organisations. This is reflected within the ten organisations8 that make up the international 
steering committee with half drawn from key grassroots organisations within Abolition 2000 and the 
other half drawn from former professional advocacy organisations of the ICBL. The latter organisations 
helped the campaign to mirror aspects of the ICBL with a tripartite structure of partner organisations, 
an international steering committee, and an independent secretariat (Interview, 2016c). At the same 
the campaign wanted to develop an intentionally ‘flexible and nimble’ (ICAN 2012) administrative 
infrastructure with important channels for public feedback and local consultation with grassroots 
organisations. Furthermore, the campaign comprises a diverse mix of humanitarian, environmental, 
and development organisations, and actively prioritises links with individuals in the Global South to 
improve representation (Interview, 2015b, 2016c). In Oslo 2013 at the first set of forums and 
conferences, ICAN presented itself to states as both a ‘legitimate global voice’ as well as a ‘serious 
governmental partner’ (Interview, 2015b).   
The ICAN Civil Society forums in Oslo (2013) and Vienna (2014) took place over two days directly 
preceding the HINW conferences, drawing an unprecedented number of CSOs; the forum in Oslo drew 
over 500 participants whilst the final forum in Vienna hosted over 620 participants from 100 
organisations in over 70 countries. The steering group organisations predominantly responsible for 
coordinating the forums prioritised diverse geographical representation and youth engagement. In a 
surprising move they ceded much of the control to younger, less experienced campaigners rather than 
traditional advocacy specialists and were impressed with the diversity and vibrancy of a post-cold war 
generation of young activists (Interview, 2015a). Although the majority of participants were from 
ICAN-affiliated organisations, the open-door nature of the forums brought forth parliamentarians, 
lawyers, scientists and religious leaders to engage with the campaign over disarmament issues.  
The inclusive nature of the forums was complemented by a parity of participation amongst its 
interlocutors. The ICSF introduced a number of innovative discursive formats ranging from open 
workshops, interactive panel discussions, rapid-fire ‘lightning speeches’, lunchtime breakout sessions, 
informal meet and greet sessions, a speakers’ corner and a marketplace for disseminating information 
(goodbyenuk.es 2014; Loretz 2013). The forum shared poetry and song, stories from the Hibakusha, 
Japanese survivors of the atomic bomb, as well as virtual media presentations from celebrities to 
religious leaders. The informal and open dialogue format reflected a ‘laboratory for experimentation’ 
(Smith et al. 2008: 41) typical of a social forum that enabled vibrant outside the box thinking on 
disarmament (Loretz 2013). On the second day of the forums, open-dialogue shifted to a more 
thematic and deliberative approach to campaign planning; breakout sessions and a special 
campaigners’ session gave activists from several countries an opportunity to bring their local activist 
knowledge to the discussions (Loretz 2014). However, as is typical with a social forum, without 
connecting these innovative discussions to those policy-makers who determine the pathways to 
disarmament, the political efficacy of public communication generated was severely limited. It was 
only when ICAN participants introduced these discussions and innovative deliberative mechanisms 
                         
8 Including Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, African Council of Religious Leaders, Religions for Peace, 
Article 36, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Latin America Human Security Network, 
Norwegian People’s Aid, PAX, Peace Boat, Swedish Physicians against Nuclear Weapons, Women’s International 
League for Peace and Freedom. 
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into the HINW conferences that a genuine ‘campaign community’ with like-minded states could take 
root (Interview, 2015a, 2016a). 
The subsequent HINW conferences in Olso (2013), Narayit (2014) and Vienna (2014) were hailed as 
unique in their equitable balance between CSOs and government delegates. At the first conference 
for example, there were 127 official CSO representatives that mirrored the 127 states present9. This 
is a dramatic departure from the PrepComs and RevCons in that the conference aimed specifically to 
engage with “audiences and participants not usually included in high-level discussions on nuclear 
weapons” (Williams et al., 2015: 8). ICAN, as official partners, were allotted the majority of CSO slots10 
ensuring a strong presence; at Oslo representatives from all bar one of the ten steering organisations 
participated. With limited numbers in comparison to the preceding ICSF, however, the international 
steering group representatives decided to prioritise youth and regional variance over traditional 
professional expertise even to the chagrin11 of some, to ensure full representation (Interview, 2015c). 
Although segmented public spheres tend to reflect restricted elite-driven dialogue, this decision by 
the committee to prioritise broader representation drawn from the prior ICSF helped to maintain a 
strong transnational public presence in the conferences. In order to ensure public information about 
the conference could still reach those that weren’t able to attend, the Women’s International League 
for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) maintained a media presence and news digest, enhancing 
transparency and helping to ensure feedback from ICAN to national public spheres.  State 
representation was equally as diverse; the HINW conferences comprised the greatest regional 
variance of any disarmament conference that has ever taken place (Minor, 2016). This was in large 
part down to the lower costs to attend, sponsorship programmes for delegates in low income 
countries, and the perception by many of new opportunities for dialogue outside of the formal RevCon 
process (Minor, 2016: 3–4). The HINW process was also unique in inviting India and Pakistan to the 
dialogue, giving delegates a chance to engage with two states that do not attend the RevCons being 
non-signatories to the NPT. By the time the 2014 Vienna conference was underway, more states (158) 
were present than had actually attended the 2014 PrepCom. 
The substantive content of the conferences was largely generated by ICAN who used the discussions 
from the ICSF to integrate a facts-based approach on the consequences of nuclear detonation with 
government delegates. CSOs therefore brought a wealth of new views, experiences and information 
that government delegates had not heard before in either the PrepComs or RevCons (Gandenberger 
and Acheson, 2014: 6). Drawing upon the deliberative techniques of the ICSFs, ICAN participants 
introduced a plethora of testimonials, oral and video presentations to government delegates and had 
unprecedented access to them whether inside the conference venue or over informal lunches. 
(Interview, 2016c). This informal approach became the conference’s greatest asset; smaller states on 
the margins could be involved in discussions without being ‘locked-out’ from closed-door sessions 
(Interview, 2016b). Indeed, ICAN was immensely successful in facilitating an environment that 
eschewed strategic bargaining and “encouraged small countries to speak up” (Interview, 2015c). Even 
                         
9  Although it should be stated that states were often represented by more than one delegate.  
10 ICAN were allotted 100 spaces for Oslo, 50 for Nayarit but were, however, unable to select the participants for the final 
conference in Vienna. Although this resulted in a slight dilution of ICAN’s presence in favour of more professional advocacy 
organisations, the format of the conference still ensured a strong deliberative structure on a relatively even playing field 
(Interview, 2015c) 
11 As a consequence of prioritising broad representation over expertise, a number of US and UK professional campaigners were 
reportedly unhappy at missing out (Interview 2015b). 
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those government delegates that were sceptical of the conferences and the initiative as a whole were 
forced to justify their positions under higher levels of scrutiny during deliberation (Interview, 2015c). 
ICAN’s executives argued that the campaign brought a more ‘dynamic dimension’ (Fihn and Acheson 
2013) and that the inclusion of a wider set of interlocutors at the conferences, combined with a less 
restrictive deliberative environment, ensured that participation was on a more even playing field than 
at either the PrepComs or RevCons.  
In terms of the overall normative legitimacy of the Humanitarian Initiative, the ICAN civil society 
forums helped to create an inclusive communicative space for a broad range of individuals to openly 
debate the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The vibrancy of these forums were reflected in 
the decision by the steering committee to prioritise diversity and representation over professional 
expertise. The substantive and procedural format from the ICSF was then integrated into the HINW 
conferences, contributing to a more informal deliberative environment between CSOs and 
government delegates to co-determine consensus on the norms and principles of the initiative.  
Informal publics and political efficacy: The Humanitarian Initiative and the Nuclear Weapons Ban 
Treaty  
A useful method in attempting to measure the political efficacy of the humanitarian initiative is to 
trace the “responsiveness” (Kissling, 2013; Steffek et al., 2010) of executive policy-makers to public 
discourses introduced by ICAN organisations within the forums and conferences. This can be done by 
analysing the overarching themes and tracing their imprint within the political and legal output of the 
NPT. This section will discuss how the key focus of the Humanitarian Initiative, as both a 
consciousness-raising exercise in nuclear catastrophe, and a new mechanism to advance nuclear 
disarmament, has gained significant and unprecedented legal traction. ICAN and its vast network of 
CSOs that have long campaigned for concrete legal measures towards disarmament have in fact 
proven extremely successful in influencing the regime.  
The immediate outcome of the final HINW conference was a surprise announcement by the Austrian 
government of a new ‘humanitarian pledge’ to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of 
nuclear weapons. This unexpected decision was met with delight from members of the ICAN steering 
group who were worried about the possible last-minute dilution of agreed outcomes amongst states 
(Interview, 2015a, 2015c). The pledge quickly gained momentum and was endorsed by 127 countries 
committed to the stigmatisation, prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, and calling on NPT 
signatories to fully implement their disarmament obligation under article VI. Crucially, the success of 
the HINW conferences opened up the door “to move beyond fact-based discussions on the effects of 
nuclear weapons to the start of treaty negotiations” (ICAN, 2015). The pledge therefore both 
legitimised and empowered discussion towards a legally binding framework for the elimination of 
nuclear weapons. 
This momentum would not be carried through the 2015 RevCon, however, where despite a full ICAN 
presence complementing a majority of NNWS in calls for legal negotiations on humanitarian grounds, 
the final consensus draft only referred to the humanitarian initiative as informative rather than 
affectual (NPT, 2015c, 2015d). A participant from ICAN’s International steering group called the draft 
RevCon consensus document “anti-democratic and non-transparent” (Acheson 2015a) reflecting the 
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views and interests of the NWS with no meaningful discussion on disarmament. The conference was 
dominated by small group deliberations between main committee chairs which made it “extremely 
difficult for small delegations from developing countries (and impossible for civil society) to 
participate” (Acheson 2015b). As such ICAN members found themselves resorting back to direct 
advocacy within the RevCon with a ‘business as usual’(Interview, 2016a) attitude reflecting the same 
obstacles to deliberation as in the previous RevCons.  
Despite this, the NNWS states were undeterred. In December 2015 the UNGA passed two key 
resolutions that further enhanced the legitimacy and efficacy of the Humanitarian Initiative. Firstly, 
resolution 70/48 was passed by 139 states (83% of the UNGA) officially endorsing the Humanitarian 
Pledge. Secondly, resolution 70/33 established an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) throughout 
2016 to look into the possibilities for concrete measures to achieve multilateral nuclear disarmament. 
This working group was ‘underpinned’ (UNGA, 2016: 4) by the humanitarian initiative and was 
effectively seen as a ‘preparatory forum for treaty negotiation’ (Interview, 2015c). The final report 
included a call by a large majority of states and CSOs to convene a UN conference in 2017 to launch 
negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty.  In October 2016, the First Committee of the United 
Nations overwhelmingly passed resolution 71/258 (123 states in favour, 38 against, 16 abstentions) 
to begin negotiations. The resolution established an open UN negotiating conference that took place 
intermittently over 20 days from March 2017 to July 2017. Throughout the draft legislation states 
lobbied to introduce the language of the humanitarian initiative (Patton and Pytlak 2017: 3) as the 
rationale from which to frame the global ethical imperative for a nuclear free world. Finally in July 
2017, the final text on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was officially adopted (122 
states in favour, 1 against, 1 abstention) with the humanitarian initiative boldly cited within the second 
paragraph of the preamble.   
ICAN may not have been as directly influential in the formal sites of power such as at the RevCons and 
even the latest UN conference negotiating the text of the treaty, but undoubtedly their work on 
framing and shaping the Humanitarian Initiative was critical. Indeed, at the organisational meeting for 
the UN conference on treaty negotiations, the Irish delegation reflected that negotiations would 
simply not have occurred “without the support and advocacy of our civil society partners” (Pytlak and 
Acheson, 2017). The development of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty highlights how policy-makers 
have been fairly ‘responsive’ (Kissling 2008; Steffek et al 2010) to the demands of civil society by 
justifying their shift towards elimination based upon the Humanitarian Initiative. 
The informal and unofficial nature of the HINW conferences and subsequent prohibition treaty, has 
however, led to an even greater fracture between the NWS and NNWS. The former have made vocal 
criticisms of the HINW conferences for “divert[ing] discussion away from practical steps” (P5, 2013) in 
the RevCon, and that the ban treaty even “endangers the viability of the NPT regime” (NPT 2017). 
These states tend to see both the conferences and ban treaty as an attempt by dissatisfied NNWS and 
CSOs to destabilise the NPT through “forum shifting” (Helfer 2004; Orsini 2013); using alternative 
forums to push a competing agenda on disarmament. However, I would argue that for ICAN and the 
majority of NNWS, the conferences and ban treaty reflect what Orisni (2013) describes as “forum 
linking”; creating new spaces designed to complement and enhance RevCons discussion on article VI 
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of the NPT.  It was the decision of the NWS not to attend the first two HINW conferences or the UN 
OEWG; ICAN organisations and the NNWS retained a full presence in all the different disarmament 
fora. 
The RevCon is still therefore the deliberative centrepiece of the NPT; the ICAN steering committee 
and member organisations attend with much passion even in the face of a conference that remains 
the preserve of realpolitik. Yet the innovative shift by ICAN and a core group of NNWS to co-develop 
new informal spaces and also to host open-dialogue forums preceding them, demonstrates the 
important democratic qualities of the Humanitarian Initiative. As an informal public sphere, comprised 
of interconnected segmented and general public spheres, deliberative debate was inclusive and 
participatory, whilst at the same time imprinting a more public-orientated political outcome in the 
form of the Nuclear Weapons Ban treaty.  
Concluding thoughts 
Transnational public debate continues to be marginalised within the RevCons and PrepComs at the 
centre of the non-proliferation regime. This is consistent with criticism of strong public spheres in 
general, where there are often democratic deficiencies in both the opinion-formation, as well as the 
political efficacy, of public communication. The rise of multi-stakeholder initiatives and more informal 
dialogic spaces on the periphery of international regimes offers new avenues for thinking about the 
important role of segmented public spheres in shaping regimes and channelling public debate through 
politically collaborative environments. These sites of deliberation, however, are often steered by 
dominant professional advocacy organisations and policy-makers through elite forms of networking. 
Finding mechanisms to dilute this form of communication and bolster the normative legitimacy of 
public communication is key to unlocking more democratic forms of governance. The humanitarian 
initiative may constitute a unique case where ICAN has benefited from an alignment of interests with 
those NNWs keen to instigate discussions over a ban treaty. Never-the-less, it demonstrates what can 
be achieved when public-orientated TANs establish and channel the substantive and procedural 
content of social forums into multi-stakeholder initiatives. Connecting segmented and general public 
spheres on the periphery of international regimes can help enhance the function of transnational 
public spheres as a democratic interface between the rule-makers and the rule-takers of global 
politics.    
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